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Abstract
We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed populations of finite size, N . A
well-mixed population means that any two individuals are equally likely to interact. In
particular we consider the average abundances of two strategies, A and B, under mutation
and selection. The game dynamical interaction between the two strategies is given by the
2 × 2 payoff matrix
(
a b
c d
)
. It has previously been shown that A is more abundant than
B, if a(N − 2) + bN > cN + d(N − 2). This result has been derived for particular
stochastic processes that operate either in the limit of asymptotically small mutation rates
or in the limit of weak selection. Here we show that this result holds in fact for a wide
class of stochastic birth-death processes for arbitrary mutation rate and for any intensity of
selection.
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary dynamics describe how successful strategies spread in a population
through genetic reproduction or cultural imitation. In mutation-selection processes
where the fitness of each individual is constant, the competition between two types
A and B is straightforward. If both fitness values are identical, then we have neu-
tral evolution (Kimura, 1968) and the average abundances of A and B are the same.
(Throughout the paper we assume symmetric mutation rates: the mutation proba-
bility from A to B is the same as from B to A.) If A is fitter than B, then A is more
abundant than B in the mutation selection equilibrium. Thus, for constant selection
the comparison of the abundances of the two types is trivial.
For frequency dependent selection, where fitness depends on the types and abun-
dances of others, the situation is more complex. One way to model these systems
are evolutionary games, where the reproductive success of individuals depends on
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their payoff derived from interaction with others (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973;
Maynard Smith, 1982; Weibull, 1995; Samuelson, 1997; Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1998; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003; Nowak and Sigmund,
2004; Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007; Sandholm, 2007). In the simplest case, interactions
are described by a 2× 2 payoff matrix,
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
. (1)
Here, an A individual obtains a from other A individuals, but b from B individuals.
Similarly, B obtains c from A, and d from other B individuals.
For a > c and b > d, strategy A dominates strategy B: Regardless of the com-
position of the population, strategy A has the higher payoff. Thus, evolutionary
dynamics will always lead to a population with more A individuals than B indi-
viduals. Equivalently, for a < c and b < d, strategy B dominates. In this case,
the average abundance of B will be higher than the average abundance of A at the
mutation-selection equilibrium.
For a > c and b < d, both strategies are best replies to themselves. This is a
‘coordination game’. In a population of mostly A individual, rare B mutants have a
lower payoff. In a population of mostly B individuals, rare A mutants have a lower
payoff. Therefore, in a mutation selection process it is not a priori clear whether
strategy A or strategy B will be more abundant at the equilibrium distribution. Two
concepts are important: (i) pareto efficiency and (ii) risk-dominance. Strategy A is
Pareto efficient if a > d. In this case, an all-A population has a higher average
payoff than an all-B population. Strategy A is risk-dominant if a + b > c + d
(Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). In this case, strategy A has a larger basin of attraction
than strategy B. In a game between two players, if I do not know what the other
person will do, it is less risky for me to choose the risk dominant strategy, but it
would be more rewarding for both of us to choose the Pareto efficient strategy.
A coordination game is especially interesting, if the risk-dominant strategy is not
Pareto efficient.
(Kandori et al., 1993) have shown that A is chosen over B if a(N − 2) + bN >
cN + d(N − 2). This means a large population selects the risk dominant equilib-
rium in the long run. They analyze a process which is stochastic in the generation
of mutants, but deterministic in following the gradient of selection. Their calcu-
lation assumes asymptotically small mutation rates, but holds for a wide range of
evolutionary processes, in contrast to previous approaches that make specific as-
sumptions on the source of noise (Foster and Young, 1990; Fudenberg and Harris,
1992). However, since the dynamics follows the gradient of selection, the processes
can only leave a Nash equilibrium if a sufficient number of mutations occurs simul-
taneously. In large populations, it is very unlikely that this happens, and the time
until the population moves from one equilibrium to another becomes exponentially
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large in N .
If the dynamics is stochastic, a single mutation can be sufficient to leave a Nash
equilibrium. Nowak et al. (2004) have studied the competition of two strategies
A and B in a frequency dependent Moran process (and similar processes) which
model fully stochastic evolutionary dynamics. This means that the selection steps
are stochastic. They have shown that the fixation probability of A is greater than
that of B if and only if a(N −2)+ bN > cN +d(N −2). This calculation assumes
weak selection in a process with selection only. The result is also valid for stronger
intensities of selection, if we use the pairwise comparison process (Szabo´ and To˝ke,
1998; Traulsen et al., 2007) or a slightly modified version of the Moran process for
evolutionary updating (Traulsen et al., 2008).
Here, we extend these results to both arbitrary mutation rates and arbitrary intensi-
ties of selection. We show that A is more abundant than B in the mutation-selection
distribution for a wide range of stochastic processes for any mutation rate and any
intensity of selection if and only if a(N − 2) + bN > cN + d(N − 2). Higher
mutation rates seem to be very relevant for social evolution, because humans (and
higher animals) tend to try new strategies fairly often. We therefore expect that
evolutionary dynamics in the cultural learning and imitation context operate under
fairly high mutation (=‘exploration’) rates. We also show that the condition holds
for any payoff matrix, not only for coordination games.
2 Pairwise comparison process
The payoffs of A and B in a population of j individuals of type A and N − j
individuals of type B are
piA(j) =
j − 1
N − 1
a+
N − j
N − 1
b
piB(j) =
j
N − 1
c+
N − j − 1
N − 1
d.
(2)
Each individual interacts withN−1 other individuals. The payoff difference ∆pi(j)
is a linear function of j
∆pi(j) = piA(j)− piB(j) =
a− b− c+ d
N − 1
j +
−a+ bN − dN + d
N − 1
. (3)
First, we need to specify how strategies spread in the population, depending on their
payoffs. We adopt the following process: a random (focal) individual i is selected. It
compares its payoff pii to the payoff pij of a randomly chosen role model, individual
j, and takes over the strategy of that individual with probability
[
1 + eβ(pii−pij)
]
−1
3
(Blume, 1993; Szabo´ and To˝ke, 1998; Traulsen et al., 2007; Sandholm, 2007). This
process occurs with probability 1−µ. With probability µ, a mutation occurs and the
focal individual produces an offspring with random strategy, A or B. The quantity
β determines the intensity of selection (0 ≤ β < ∞). Strong selection (large β)
means that the probability to adopt a better strategy approaches one, and the proba-
bility to adopt an inferior strategy vanishes. For weak selection (small β), these two
probabilities are close to 1/2. The transition probabilities to increase or decrease
the number of A players by one, are given by
T+j =
j
N
N − j
N
1− µ
1 + e−β∆pi(j)
+
N − j
N
µ
2
T−j =
j
N
N − j
N
1− µ
1 + e+β∆pi(j)
+
j
N
µ
2
.
(4)
With these transition probabilities, we can determine whether A is more abundant
than B or vice versa. Before discussing the problem for general mutation rates
we first consider the special case of low mutation rates, because of its importance
in previous papers (Kandori et al., 1993; Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004;
Imhof and Fudenberg, 2006). We will also present a simple approximation for very
high mutation rates, which illustrates the dynamics in this extreme limit.
2.1 Low mutation rates
First, we consider low mutation rates, µ ≪ N−2. In this limit, a mutation reaches
extinction or fixation before a second mutation arises. Thus, the important quan-
tity is the probability that a single mutant takes over the population in a process
without mutations (Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004; Imhof and Fudenberg,
2006; Antal and Scheuring, 2006). The ratio of the fixation probability ρA of a sin-
gle A player and that of a single B player can be written as (Karlin and Taylor,
1975; Nowak, 2006)
ρB
ρA
=
N−1∏
j=1
T−j
T+j
. (5)
Without mutations, µ = 0, the ratio of the transition probabilities (4), simplifies to
T−j /T
+
j = e
−β∆pi(j) (Traulsen et al., 2006, 2007). Thus, ρB/ρA reduces to
ρB
ρA
= exp

−β N−1∑
j=1
∆pi(j)

 = exp
[
−β
(
a+ b− c− d
2
N − a+ d
)]
. (6)
Therefore, ρA = ρB is equivalent to
(a+ b− c− d)N = 2a− 2d . (7)
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From the payoff matrix (2) it is clear, that strategy A is favored whenever a or b
increases, or c or d decreases. Therefore, A is more abundant than B if
a(N − 2) + bN > cN + d(N − 2) . (8)
This condition has been derived previously in the low mutation limit for different
evolutionary processes (Kandori et al., 1993; Nowak, 2006; Traulsen et al., 2008).
The strategy with the higher fixation probability is the more abundant one, because
more of its mutants reach fixation. Thus for low mutation rates, A has a higher
abundance than B whenever condition (8) is fulfilled.
For weak selection, a wide range of processes fulfills the 1/3-rule, which states
that the fixation probability of a single A mutant in a coordination game is larger
than 1/N if a(N − 2) + b(2N − 1) > c(N + 1) + d(2N − 4) (Nowak et al., 2004;
Imhof and Nowak, 2006; Lessard and Ladret, 2007; Bomze and Pawlowitsch, 2008).
The fixation probability for large N can thus be written as
ρA =
1
N
+ ω
(
1
3
−
d− b
a− b− c+ d
)
, (9)
where ω is a small positive number that may depend on the payoffs and on N .
Writing down the analogous equation for ρB and subtracting yields
ρA − ρB = ω
(
a− c
d− c− b+ a
−
d− b
a− b− c+ d
)
∝ a + b− c− d . (10)
Thus, ρA > ρB is equivalent to a + b > c + d, which is identical to our condition
(8) for large N . Lessard and Ladret (2007) have shown that any process within the
domain of Kingman’s coalescent (Kingman, 1982) fulfills the 1/3-rule (for large N
and weak selection and mutation). If an evolutionary process fulfills the 1/3-rule,
ρA and ρB can be written in the form of (9). Hence we find again that ρA > ρB
is equivalent to a + b > c + d. Thus, we conclude that our result is valid for any
process within the domain of Kingman’s coalescent for large N and weak selection
and mutation.
2.2 High mutation rates
For high mutation rates µ → 1, mutations dominate the process, and drive the
system towards equal abundance of A and B, that is close to j = N/2. Hence the
relevant transition probabilities are T+N/2 and T
−
N/2, and it is plausible to assume that
T+N/2 > T
−
N/2 implies that A is more abundant than B in the stationary state. From
(4) we obtain
T+N/2 − T
−
N/2 =
1− µ
4
tanh
(
β
2
∆pi(N/2)
)
, (11)
5
where the payoff difference is given by
∆pi(N/2) =
(a+ b− c− d)N − 2(a− d)
2(N − 1)
. (12)
Since ∆pi(N/2) > 0 implies T+N/2 − T
−
N/2 > 0, it also implies a more abundant
A, for arbitrary intensity of selection β. Thus, we have again the same condition
a(N − 2) + bN > cN + d(N − 2) for the dominance of A.
2.3 Arbitrary mutation rates
So far we have shown that both for low and high mutation rates the same condi-
tion determines whether A or B is more abundant, regardless of the intensity of
selection. Now, we turn to general mutation rates. Whenever equation (7) holds,
the payoff difference (3) has the following symmetry property
∆pi(j) = −∆pi(N − j) . (13)
This antisymmetry in the payoff differences then implies the following symmetry
in our transition probabilities (4),
T+j = T
−
N−j . (14)
For symmetric transition probabilities, however, the stationary probabilities pj of
having j number of A players, are also symmetric, pj = pN−j . This can be shown
by first writing the stationary probability distribution explicitly (Kampen, 1997;
Claussen and Traulsen, 2005)
pj = p0
j−1∏
i=0
T+i
T−i+1
(15)
where p0 follows from the normalization
∑N
j=0 pj = 1. For symmetric transition
probabilities (14) and for j < N − j we can write
pN−j
pj
=
N−j−1∏
i=j
T+i
T−i+1
=
N−j−1∏
i=j
T+i
T+N−i−1
= 1. (16)
Hence the distribution is symmetric pj = pN−j .
For such a symmetric distribution, the number of A and B players are of course the
same, since
〈j〉 =
N∑
j=0
jpj =
N∑
j=0
jpN−j =
N∑
j=0
(N − j)pj = 〈N − j〉 . (17)
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Hence we have demonstrated that when (7) is fulfilled, then the average abundance
of A players and B players are the same.
On the other hand, when condition (8) is fulfilled, then the average abundance of
A players is higher than the average abundance of B players. This is quite obvious
by looking at the payoff matrix (1): increasing a or b favors A, while increasing
c or d favors B. More formally, we could say that from (2), (3) and (4) it is clear
that T+j and −T−j are monotone increasing functions of a and b, and decreasing
functions of c and d. This implies condition (8). Interestingly, other features of the
game do not matter, e.g. whether a single A player has a larger disadvantage in a B
population than a single B player in an A population.
Condition (8) can also be written in the form
a
(
1−
2
N
)
+ b > c+ d
(
1−
2
N
)
, (18)
which highlights the fact that there is a 1/N correction compared to simple risk
dominance (a + b > c + d), which is the N → ∞ limit. This implies that a strat-
egy can be more abundant than the other strategy for large N , but less abundant
for small N . For example for the payoff matrix
(
10 3
11 1
)
, strategy A is more abun-
dant in large populations (N ≥ 19), but B is more abundant in small populations
(N ≤ 17). They are equally abundant for N = 18. In general, there is a threshold
population size N∗ = 2(a−d)/(a−d+b−c). If N∗ > 2, then A is more abundant
than B either for N > N∗ or for N < N∗.
2.4 Including self-interactions
So far, we have adopted the usual convention that individuals cannot interact with
themselves. If instead we allow individuals to derive a payoff from self-interaction,
we obtain
fA(j) =
j
N
a+
N − j
N
b
fB(j) =
j
N
c+
N − j
N
d.
(19)
Hence, the payoff difference is ∆pi(j) = (a − b − c + d) j/N + b − d. Now
for all mutation rates and all intensities of selection the condition for the average
abundance of A to exceed the average abundance of B is simple risk dominance:
a + b > c + d . (20)
We conclude that the finite N correction to risk dominance in (18) results from the
exclusion of self-interactions.
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3 Frequency dependent Moran process
Although condition (8) is valid for a large class of evolutionary processes (see
Sec. 4), it does not always hold if we depart from weak selection. As an example we
discuss the frequency dependent Moran process (Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al.,
2004; Antal and Scheuring, 2006). As we shall see, for this model our condition (8)
is only valid in the limit of weak selection.
Let the fitness be a convex combination of a background fitness (which we set to 1)
and the payoff, fA(j) = 1 − w + wpiA(j) and fB(j) = 1 − w + wpiB(j). Here, w
is the intensity of selection (0 ≤ w ≤ 1 for payoff matrices with positive entries).
An individual is selected for reproduction at random, but proportional to fitness.
The selected individual produces an offspring, which replaces a randomly chosen
individual. Mutation can occur during reproduction. This leads to the transition
probabilities
T+j =
j fA(j)
F (j)
N − j
N
(1− µ) +
(N − j)fB(j)
F (j)
N − j
N
µ
T−j =
(N − j)fB(j)
F (j)
j
N
(1− µ) +
j fA(j)
F (j)
j
N
µ .
(21)
Here F (j) = jfA(j) + (N − j)fB(j) is the total fitness of the whole population.
These transition probabilities depend on the fitness values only through the ratio
fA(j)/fB(j). Yet, there is no simple condition for the equilibrium abundance of A
players. In the weak selection limit, w ≪ 1, however, only the payoff differences
enter into the transition probabilities (21),
fA(j)
fB(j)
= 1 + w∆pi(j) +O(w2) . (22)
Thus, for weak selection, condition (8) again ensures the higher abundance of A.
We can also consider a variant of the frequency dependent Moran process where
fitness is an exponential function of payoff, fA(j) = exp[+wpiA(j)] and fB(j) =
exp[+wpiB(j)] (Traulsen et al., 2008). In this case, the transition probabilities again
only depend on the payoff differences, because fA(j)/fB(j) = exp(w∆pi(j)).
Hence, the condition for abundance is again (8) for any intensity of selection and
any mutation rate.
4 General birth death processes
Here, we show that our finding holds for a wide range of birth-death processes. We
need two requirements to be fulfilled. The first is that the payoffs received from
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other players should be additive. In this case the payoffs piA(j), piB(j), and also the
payoff difference ∆pi(j) are linear functions of j. Consequently,
∆pi(j) + ∆pi(N − j) = λ(a, b, c, d, N) (23)
is independent of j. Hence, when λ(a, b, c, d, N) = 0 holds, we have an antisym-
metric payoff function
∆pi(j) = −∆pi(N − j). (24)
The second requirement is that the difference between the two types of players
should manifest itself in the transition probabilities T+j and T−j , only through the
the payoff difference ∆pi(j). Hence, we can write T−j = T−j [∆pi(j), µ], and the
probability of decreasing the number of mutants is
T−j = T
−
j [∆pi(j), µ] = T
+
N−j[−∆pi(j), µ]. (25)
That is, the only difference between the two types is the change of sign of the payoff
difference ∆pi(j). Otherwise, the transition probabilities are the same, but with the
number of the opposite type of individuals N − j. Now, simply setting the index to
N − j in (25), we have
T−N−j = T
+
j [−∆pi(N − j), µ] = T
+
j [∆pi(j), µ] = T
+
j . (26)
For the second equality we have used (24). These symmetric transition probabili-
ties then imply an equal abundance of the two types of players in any birth-death
process, as it has been shown in Section 2.3. The condition for a higher abundance
of A compared to B is then λ(a, b, c, d, N) > 0. This general condition takes the
form of (8) or (20) in our examples when self-interaction are excluded or included,
respectively. Note that similar arguments appear in (Claussen, 2007).
5 Discussion
In this paper, we have shown that a(N − 2) + bN > cN + d(N − 2) is the crucial
condition for A to be favored over B in wide range of evolutionary processes for
any mutation rate, any intensity of selection and any finite population size. By A
being favored over B we mean that A is more abundant than B in the mutation-
selection equilibrium of the stochastic process.
The relative abundance in the stationary state is a natural way of comparing two
strategies. In the low mutation limit, when the population is typically homogeneous,
a strategy being more abundant is equivalent of having a larger fixation probability.
Hence, our study of abundance can be viewed as a generalization of that concept
to arbitrary mutation rates. This is of special interest for cultural dynamics, where
mutation rates are not necessarily small.
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In particular, we have generalized the famous result of Kandori et al. (1993) to
any mutation rate. We have generalized the result of Nowak et al. (2004) to any
intensity of selection. Our results are valid for any mutation rate and any intensity
of selection.
It turns out that for our result to hold, a birth-death process has to fulfill two require-
ments: (i) additive payoffs, and (ii) that that the evolutionary dynamics depend only
on the payoff differences (the players are identical otherwise). These requirements
hold, for example, for the pairwise comparison process described by Traulsen et
al. (2006) and for a frequency dependent Moran process with exponential fitness
function (Traulsen et al, 2008). For the standard frequency dependent Moran pro-
cess with linear fitness function these requirements only hold in the limit of weak
selection.
Finally, we note that in coordination games with strong selection both the fixation
probability of A and the fixation probability of B are very small. For small mutation
rates, the system will stay in one equilibrium for a very long time. Therefore, it
can take a very long time for the system to obtain a representative sample of the
stationary mutation-selection distribution.
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